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Who's Watching the Watchdog?: Self-
Evaluative Privilege and Journalistic
Responsibility in Westmoreland v.
CBS, Inc. 1
by PAUL A. WEISS*
But it would be bizarre, ironic and sad if the law in effect virtu-
ally required these journalistic inquiries to be made only by
lawyers, for fear that a contrary practice would make such in-
ternal inquiries available to anyone filing a libel complaint. In
the final analysis the public trust is ours, the journalists.
-Edward R. Cony, Vice President/News of Dow Jones and
Company2
[A] lawyer would have done a "more sensible" report.
-David Boies, outside counsel for CBS, regarding the Benja-
min Report'
I
Introduction
The first amendment to the U.S. Constitution grants to the
press the special role of watchdog over the functioning of our
government.4 With this special status come constitutional limi-
tations on the ability of government to regulate the press.5 As
the power and influence of the newsgathering media have in-
creased, however, the public has come to feel that it is from the
press that it needs protection.6 Thus, a major societal concern
has become facilitating the ability and incentive of the watch-
* Member, Third Year Class; A.B., University of California at Berkeley, 1980.
1. 97 F.R.D. 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
2. Affidavit of Edward R. Cony at 3, Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 97 F.R.D. 703
(S.D.N.Y. 1983). Dow Jones and Company publishes the Wall Street Journal.
3. Bruck, The Mea Culpa Defense-How CBS Brought on the Westmoreland
Suit-and Sacrificed One of Its Own, AM. LAw., Sept. 1983, at 86.
4. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966).
5. See infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
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dog to watch itself.7 The two primary methods of curbing jour-
nalistic excesses have been the civil suit for defamation and the
encouragement of the media to monitor and regulate
themselves.
The case of Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc.' raised the issue of
the relative viability of these two methods in a litigation con-
text. At odds were the right of a network news division to con-
duct a candid self-evaluation in confidence and the right of a
defamation plaintiff to obtain information in preparation for
trial. The trial court did not answer the question whether the
public interest in encouraging media responsibility was best
served by granting the defendant an evidentiary self-evaluation
privilege, but instead ruled that CBS waived any privilege that
may have existed.
This note analyzes the self-evaluative privilege (SEP) under
the Westmoreland facts. First, it examines the nature, limita-
tions, and policies of the privilege. Next, it considers whether
the SEP should be extended to newsgathering media defend-
ants. Finally, the note scrutinizes the ruling in Westmoreland
that CBS waived its privilege, in light of the policies underlying
the SEP.
II
Background
On January 23, 1982, CBS News aired "The Uncounted En-
emy: A Vietnam Deception," a ninety-minute documentary
which charged that the highest levels of American military in-
telligence consistently suppressed and altered troop count re-
ports during the Vietnam War. Three days later, Generals
William C. Westmoreland and Daniel Graham held a press con-
ference, denouncing the show and demanding an apology from
CBS. CBS News responded by announcing an in-house investi-
gation. The controversy surrounding the show was further fu-
eled by a TV Guide investigative report9 that sharply criticized
the journalistic practices followed in producing the program.10
7. See infra notes 113-14, 124-25 and accompanying text.
8. 97 F.R.D. 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
9. Kowet & Bedell, Anatomy of a Smear: How CBS News Broke the Rules and
"Got" Gen. Westmoreland, TV GUIDE, May 29, 1982, at 2.
10. Kowet and Bedell accused CBS News, inter alia, of tailoring the evidence
presented to fit its preconceived conclusions, rehearsing "friendly" witnesses, quoting
out of context, paying $25,000 to a consultant "obsessed" with proving the show's
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On July 15, 1982, one week after receiving the results of the
in-house study, Van Gordon Sauter, President of CBS News,
made public an eight-page memorandum that supported the
substance of the "Uncounted Enemy" broadcast but also criti-
cized the editorial procedures used.1
The CBS in-house study was conducted by Burton Benjamin,
a Senior Executive Producer for CBS News. Although CBS
contemplated using either inside or outside counsel to conduct
and/or supervise the investigation, Sauter wished the resulting
report to reflect "a journalistic, not a legalistic judgment."'12
Benjamin, a documentary producer himself, was chosen to con-
duct the study because of his reputation for impeccable honesty
and for strict interpretation of the CBS News Guidelines."
The resulting report was a retrospective review of the editorial
decisions made in producing the show and dealt primarily with
adherence to the Guidelines. 4 The Sauter Memorandum did
not disclose the contents of the Benjamin Report, other than to
report the manner in which the study was conducted. It did,
however, purport to reflect Benjamin's conclusions, as well as
those of Edward Joyce, Executive Vice President of CBS News,
and of Sauter himselt.' 5
In September 1982, Gen. Westmoreland filed suit in federal
district court,'6 alleging that CBS had defamed him both in
broadcasting the "Uncounted Enemy" show and in issuing the
Sauter Memorandum. 7 CBS resisted Westmoreland's attempts
to obtain the Benjamin Report through pretrial discovery.'8
The network argued that the Benjamin Report was a confiden-
tial self-evaluative analysis and therefore within the ambit of a
premise, violating its own guidelines, and failing to review the producer's work prop-
erly. Id. at 4, 15.
11. A copy of the Sauter Memorandum is on file in the Comm/Ent Office.
12. Bruck, supra note 3, at 84.
13. Id. at 84, 86.
14. A copy of the Benjamin Report is on file in the Comm/Ent Office.
15. Sauter Memorandum, supra note 11, at 2.
16. Bruck, supra note 3, at 82.
17. See Westmoreland, 97 F.R.D. 703.
18. Litigants in a federal court proceeding "may obtain discovery regarding any
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action." FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1). CBS later contested the admissability of the Benja-
min Report at trial. The court ruled that the greater portion of the Report was in-
admissable as either irrelevant, hearsay, or opinion evidence. Westmoreland v. CBS,
Inc., No. 82 Civ. 7913 (PNL), slip op. at 4-8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 1984). A copy of the slip
opinion is on file in the Comm/Ent Office. See also infra notes 117 and 120.
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common law privilege which has evolved for such documents. 19
Westmoreland discounted both the weight 0 and the scope2 '
of the authority establishing such a privilege and argued that, if
any privilege existed, CBS had waived it in releasing the Sauter
Memorandum.22 CBS distinguished Sauter's and Benjamin's
conclusions from the sources that served as the basis for those
conclusions. The network maintained that the latter had al-
ways been confidential and that no waiver had occurred.23
It was on this last issue of waiver that the court based its
Opinion and Order. Ruling that CBS had "not treated the Ben-
jamin report as a confidential internal matter, '2 4 it found "no
occasion to consider whether defendants' arguments would pre-
vail in establishing. . . a [self-evaluative] privilege on appropri-
19. Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Pro-
duction of the "Benjamin Report" at 10-14, Westmoreland, 97 F.R.D. 703 [hereinafter
cited as Defendants' Opposition]; Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's "Reply to De-
fendants' Opposition to Motion to Compel Production of 'Benjamin Report'" at 5-10,
Westmoreland, 99 F.R.D. 703 [hereinafter cited as Defendants' Response]. CBS's
main authorities in asserting this privilege were Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 552
F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977); Lloyd v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,
74 F.R.D. 518 (E.D. Tenn. 1977); Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 53 F.R.D. 283 (N.D.
Ga. 1971); Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970), affd, 479 F.2d
920 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
The merits of CBS's alternative theories for resisting discovery of the Benjamin
Report-that production would be oppressive, Defendants' Opposition, supra, at 13-
16, that the Report was protected under the New York Shield Law, N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS
LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1979 & Supp. 1983-1984), Defendants' Response, supra, at 14,
and that the Report would be insufficiently likely to lead to the discovery of relevant
evidence, Defendants' Response, supra, at 15-16--are beyond the scope of this note.
See Westmoreland, 97 F.R.D. 703. Copies of Defendants' Opposition and Defendants'
Response are on file in the Comm/Ent Office.
20. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Authorities in Support of Motion to Compel Dis-
covery at 7, Westmoreland, 97 F.R.D. 703 [hereinafter cited as Plaintiff's Motion] (cit-
ing Federal Trade Comm'n v. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d 207, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). But cf.
infra note 50 and accompanying text. A copy of Plaintiff's Motion is on file in the
Comm/Ent Office.
21. Plaintiff's Motion, supra note 20, at 7-8. See also Plaintiff's Reply to Defend-
ants' Opposition to Motion to Compel Production of "Benjamin Report" at 4-14, West-
moreland, 97 F.R.D. 703 [hereinafter cited as Plaintiff's Reply]. A copy of Plaintiff's
Reply is on file in the Comm/Ent Office.
22. Plaintiff's Motion, supra note 20, at 8-9 (citing Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson &
Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926 (N.D. Cal. 1976); In re Penn Cent. Commercial Paper Litig.,
61 F.R.D. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. United Tel. Co. of
Fla., 60 F.R.D. 177 (M.D. Fla. 1973)). Indeed, plaintiff charged that CBS never in-
tended to undertake a confidential study. Plaintiff's Reply, supra note 21, at 2.
23. Defendants' Opposition, supra note 19, at 12; Defendants' Response, supra
note 19, at 5-6.
24. Westmoreland, 97 F.R.D. at 706.
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ate facts."2 Because the Benjamin Report is "central to the
public message of the Sauter Memorandum"26 and because it
"implies, or states, that the Benjamin report substantiates the
conclusions of the Uncounted Enemy broadcast, ' 27 the court
concluded that CBS could no longer "decline to reveal the Re-
port contending that it is a confidential internal study utilized
solely for self-evaluation and self-improvement." '28
III
Status of the Self-Evaluative Privilege
A common law privilege has evolved in the federal courts for
self-evaluative materials in medical malpractice and employ-
ment discrimination litigation. In these contexts, the public's
interest in fostering candid, confidential self-analysis outweighs
the plaintiff's need for full disclosure. The privilege is subject
to limitations, the most important of which is the rule that the
SEP does not extend to factual material and statistics.
A. Applicable Law
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that a person's privi-
lege shall be determined by state law in cases in which state
law applies as the rule of the decision.'
In Westmoreland, a defamation action maintained in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York, issues
relating to privilege should be settled by reference to New
York law. Unfortunately, there is no statutory or case law re-
garding the SEP in New York. New York state courts are nev-
ertheless capable of creating common law privileges30 and,
indeed, have done so in other contexts.31 Furthermore, New
York courts have held that "even where there is no legal privi-
lege against disclosure, certain types of information, confiden-
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. FED. R. EVID. 501.
30. D. SIEGEL, HANDBOOK ON NEW YORK PRACTICE § 346 (1978). Cf. CAL. EVID.
CODE § 911(b) (West 1983): "Except as otherwise provided by statute,. . . [n]o person
has a privilege. . . to refuse to produce any writing, object, or other thing." Id. (em-
phasis added).
31. See, e.g., Cirale v. 80 Pine St. Corp., 35 N.Y.2d 113, 359 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1974); City
of New York v. Bustop Shelters, Inc., 104 Misc.2d 702, 428 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Sup. Ct. Trial
Term 1980) (recognizing common law "official information" privilege).
No. 1]
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tial in nature ... should be accorded judicial safeguards
whenever possible."3 2 While there exists no self-evaluative
privilege in New York, the case law of that jurisdiction provides
ample room for its recognition, by reference to the law of other
jurisdictions.
Federal case law regarding the SEP is considerably more de-
veloped than that of the states that have addressed the issue3 3
and is, therefore, much more expositive of the privilege's un-
derlying limitations and policies. Hence, the genesis and scope
of the SEP is considered here primarily in the context of its
development in the federal courts.
B. Does a Common Law SEP Exist?
The judicial creation of a privilege for confidential self-analy-
sis can be traced to Bredice v. Doctors Hospital, Inc. 4 In Bred-
ice, a malpractice action brought in the District of Columbia,
plaintiff sought discovery of any hospital review committee re-
ports that related to the death of plaintiff's decedent. 5 The
court held that the records of medical staff review committee
meetings were entitled to a qualified privilege based on an
"overwhelming public interest."3 The court reasoned that
32. La Monte v. Smith, 10 A.D.2d 678, 678, 197 N.Y.S.2d 251, 252 (1960).
33. Research for this note uncovered case law from only seven state jurisdictions
that deals directly with a common law SEP. The Wisconsin and Arizona Supreme
Courts found public policy considerations insufficiently compelling to warrant judicial
creation of the privilege. Davison v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 75 Wis. 2d 190,
204, 248 N.W.2d 433, 441 (1977); Jolly v. Superior Court, 112 Ariz. 186, 190, 540 P.2d
658, 662 (1975). In Sherman v. District Court, 637 P.2d 378, 384 (Colo. 1981), the court
expressed particular reluctance to create a general SEP where the legislature had
created a confidential reports privilege of narrow applicability. Nebraska judicially
adopted the SEP without significant discussion in Oviatt v. Archbishop Bergan Mercy
Hospital, 191 Neb. 224, 226-27, 214 N.W.2d 490, 492 (1974), whereas Kentucky rejected
the privilege more or less out-of-hand in Nazareth Literary & Benevolent Inst. v. Ste-
phenson, 503 S.W.2d 177, 179 (Ky. 1973). The court in Berst v. Chipman, 232 Kan. 180,
191-93, 653 P.2d 107, 116-17, (1982), declined to protect confidential self-critical docu-
ments, at least "where the information [sought] goes to the 'heart of the plaintiffs
claim.'" The Florida Court of Appeals, following federal precedent, created an SEP
in Dade County Medical Ass'n v. Hlis, 372 So. 2d 117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); for
some inexplicable reason, however, a different panel of the same court concluded that
the policies that supported the adoption of the privilege were inapposite when the
party seeking production was the subject of the confidential study. Auld v. Holly, 418
So. 2d 1020, 1026 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). Of these state court opinions, only Berst
considers in depth the policy issues underlying recognition of the SEP.
34. 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C.), adhered to, 51 F.R.D. 187 (D.D.C. 1970), affd, 479 F.2d
920 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
35. 50 F.R.D. at 249.
36. Id. at 251.
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public policy favors doctors' having access to the most up-to-
date technology and knowledge and that such access would be
impeded if staff meetings lost their confidentiality:37
Confidentiality is essential to effective functioning of these
staff meetings; and these meetings are essential to the contin-
ued improvement in the care and treatment of patients. Can-
did and conscientious evaluation of clinical practices is a sine
qua non of adequate hospital care. To subject these discussions
and deliberations to the discovery process, without a showing
of exceptional necessity, would result in terminating such de-
liberations. Constructive professional criticism cannot occur in
an atmosphere of apprehension that one doctor's suggestion
will be used as a denunciation of a colleague's conduct in a mal-
practice suit.
The purpose of these staff meetings is the improvement,
through self-analysis, of the efficiency of medical procedures
and techniques .... The value of these discussions and re-
views ... is undeniable. This value would be destroyed if the
meetings and the names of those participating were to be
opened to the discovery process.38
This rationale was applied very soon after Bredice by a Geor-
gia district court in Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co. 39 The Banks
court broadened considerably the ambit of the SEP, finding it
applicable to internal studies regarding employment practices
conducted by a defendant charged with employment discrimi-
nation.40 Like Bredice, the ruling was grounded on public pol-
icy considerations; the court felt that compelled disclosure
would discourage effective self-evaluation, thereby inhibiting
the development of affirmative action programs.41 The Banks
holding has been followed now in at least eleven other employ-
ment discrimination cases.'
37. Id.
38. Id. at 250. Hospital committee reports have also been held privileged in pro-
ceedings under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Gillman v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 316,
318 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
39. 53 F.R.D. 283 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
40. Id. at 285.
41. Id.
42. Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 552 F.2d 579 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
904 (1977); Jamison v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 511 F. Supp. 1286 (E.D. Mich. 1981);
Nash v. City of Oakwood, 90 F.R.D. 633 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Roberts v. National Detroit
Corp., 87 F.R.D. 30 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Rosario v. New York Times Co., 84 F.R.D. 626
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Stevenson v. General Elec. Co., 18 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 8777
(S.D. Ohio 1978); Parker v. Kroger Co., 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 8995 (N.D. Ga.
1977); Johnson v. Southern Ry. Co., 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 9076 (N.D. Ga. 1977);
Scott v. McDonald, 70 F.R.D. 568 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Dickerson v. United States Steel
No. 1]
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In some sixteen cases, federal courts have refused to grant a
self-evaluative privilege; in fifteen of these, however, the hold-
ings do not conflict with Bredice, Banks, and their progeny.
Seven courts found that the self-analyses in question were not
confidential,43 while four concluded that the material sought
was not self-evaluative." In three instances, the SEP was de-
clared unavailable when the party seeking disclosure was a U.S.
government agency.45 Two confidential self-evaluations were
held not to be of a type subject to the rationale behind the privi-
lege.46 It should also be noted that many of the courts that de-
clined to apply the SEP still cited Bredice and its progeny with
approval.
Only one federal court, in Gray v. Board of Higher Educa-
tion,4' has weighed concerns similar to those considered in the
Bredice and Banks decisions and yet has refused to protect con-
fidential self-evaluative memoranda; the court's ruling, how-
ever, was a narrow one. The Gray court concluded that under
certain circumstances, limited disclosure may be available.49
The court based its holding on three factors: plaintiff's compel-
ling need for the information in order to prepare for trial, the
fact that limited disclosure would have a minimal chilling ef-
fect in discouraging self-evaluation, and the fact that disclosure
might favor the social policy which allegedly required
Corp., 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1448 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Sanday v. Carnegie-Mel-
Ion Univ., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 101 (W.D. Pa. 1975). Cf. New York Stock
Exch., Inc. v. Sloan, 22 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 500, 504 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
43. Memorial Hosp. v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058 (7th Cir. 1981); Lynn v. Regents of
the Univ. of Cal., 656 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1981); Jepsen v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 610
F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1980); Emerson Elec. Co. v. Schlesinger, 609 F.2d 898 (8th Cir.
1979); Reynolds Metals Co. v. Rumsfeld, 564 F.2d 663 (4th Cir. 1977); EEOC v. Univer-
sity of Notre Dame Du Lac, 551 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Ind. 1982); Ott v. St. Luke Hosp.,
522 F. Supp. 706 (E.D. Ky. 1981).
44. Webb v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 81 F.R.D. 431 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Lloyd v.
Cessna Aircraft Co., 74 F.R.D. 518 (E.D. Tenn. 1977); Wright v. Patrolmen's Benevo-
lent Ass'n, 72 F.R.D. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See also Robinson v. Magovern, 83 F.R.D.
79, 89 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
45. FTC v. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Emerson Elec. Co. v. Schles-
inger, 609 F.2d 898 (8th Cir. 1979); In re Horizon Corp., 88 F.T.C. 515 (1976).
46. Resnick v. American Dental Ass'n, 95 F.R.D. 372 (N.D. Ill. 1982), but see infra
notes 87-91 and accompanying text; Davidson v. Light, 79 F.R.D. 137 (D. Colo. 1978),
see also infra note 92 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Jepsen, 610 F.2d at 1384; Lloyd, 74 F.R.D. at 522; Wright, 72 F.R.D. at
164.
48. 692 F.2d 901 (2d Cir. 1982).
49. Id. at 905-09.
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confidentiality. 0
It is apparent that a self-evaluative privilege has developed in
the federal courts since Bredice.51 The SEP, however, is a rela-
tively young common law privilege, and there is still a dearth of
appellate commentary regarding it. 2 Moreover, pretrial dis-
covery privileges are generally looked upon with disfavor.53 As
a result, the privilege is of somewhat uncertain application.
Therefore, the policies underlying the SEP, as well as its recog-
nized limitations, must be examined to ascertain its availability
to newsgathering media defendants.
C. Policy Basis for the SEP
The first question asked when considering the creation of a
privilege must be whether public policy is furthered by main-
taining the confidentiality of the communication at issue.' Es-
sentially, the problem involves a balancing of the benefits of
protection against the benefits of disclosure.55
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow "discovery re-
50. Id. One author has commented that, because the ruling was of limited scope,
"the [Gray] opinion will be of little assistance to other courts confronted with disputes
over disclosing peer-review material." Flanagan, Rejecting a General Privilege for
Sef-Crtical Analysis, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 551, 580 (1983).
51. Murphy, The Se~f-Evaluative Privilege, 7 J. CORP. L. 489,495 (1982); see also J.
LucAs, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.60[3] n.1 (2d ed. Supp. 1983-1984); Note, The
Privilege of SefCritical Analysis, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1087 n.16 (1983).
52. Note, supra note 51, at 1085 n.12; see also Defendants' Response, supra note
19, at 7 n.3 and accompanying text.
53. This has been especially true in employment discrimination suits, the major
area in which the SEP has been asserted. Wood v. Breier, 54 F.R.D. 7, 10 (E.D. Wis.
1972); Note, supra note 51, at 1090 n.29.
54. See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
55. John H. Wigmore, in his treatise on evidence, set forth four fundamental cri-
teria for the creation of a privilege:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not
be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satis-
factory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought
to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the com-
munications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the cor-
rect disposal of litigation.
Only if these four conditions are present should a privilege be recognized.
8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (emphasis in original).
Certainly if the communication is not in fact confidential, no privilege should attach.
See supra note 43 and accompanying text; infra notes 132-54 and accompanying text.
Practically, whether Wigmore's second and third criteria have been met is a matter of
degree and as such should be balanced in the analysis under criterion (4).
No. 1]
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garding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the sub-
ject matter involved in the pending action. '5 6 The Supreme
Court has amplified the general policy favoring broad discovery
of "every man's evidence, ' 57 instructing that privileges should
neither be "lightly created nor expansively construed."5' 8 Thus,
the primary factors that weigh in favor of disclosure of self-
evaluative materials are the adverse party's need for evidence
to establish his or her case and the fact that any statement in-
cluded in a self-evaluative study probably was made closer in
time to the events giving rise to the cause of action than those
statements made after discovery commences.5 9
While it is in the public's best interest that certain confiden-
tial self-analyses are undertaken,60 disclosure of the conclu-
sions and opinions expressed in these evaluations in the course
of civil litigation "almost inevitably" will discourage such eval-
uations."' First of all, critical information from colleagues and
coworkers will likely be less candid, less forthcoming, and less
constructive; therefore, any studies based on this inferior infor-
mation will necessarily be of inferior value.62 Nor is the man-
agement of the evaluating entity immune from fear of
disclosure; it may in fact choose not to conduct the self-analysis
if in so doing it will expose the entity or its employees to ad-
verse publicity or civil liability. 3
If the studies are mandated by statute, compelled disclosure
may discourage cooperation and thus undermine the legisla-
ture's purpose.6 4 The self-evaluating entity, aware of the possi-
bility of disclosure, may carry out the mandated investigation
with a modicum of zeal and with less-than-perfect candor, or it
may even set minimal performance goals for itself so as to avoid
providing future plaintiffs with potentially damaging
56. FED. R. CIV. PROC. 26(b)(1).
57. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (executive privilege).
58. Id.; see also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (husband-wife
privilege).
59. Gillman v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 316, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
60. Banks, 53 F.R.D. at 285; Bredice, 50 F.R.D. at 250.
61. O'Connor v. Chrysler Corp., 86 F.R.D. 211, 217 (D. Mass. 1980).
62. Id at 216-17; Banks, 53 F.R.D. at 285; Bredice, 50 F.R.D. at 250. Professor
Flanagan suggests that this problem is especially applicable to peer-review studies.
Flanagan, supra note 50, at 560-65.
63. O'Connor, 86 F.R.D. at 217-18; Banks, 53 F.R.D. at 285. See also Flanagan,
supra note 49, at 559.
64. Jamison v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 511 F. Supp. 1286, 1296 (E.D. Mich. 1981);
O'Connor, 86 F.R.D. at 217; Banks, 53 F.R.D. at 285.
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evidence."5
If disclosure does indeed discourage confidential self-evalua-
tions, some litigants will conduct self-evaluations through
counsel, thereby seeking protection under the attorney-client
privilege or the work-product rule.66 This result will further
reduce the value of the self-evaluation. Even assuming argu-
endo that the attorney is familiar with the subject matter of the
study, diagnosis and correction of what are essentially manage-
ment problems are rarely the functions of counsel. 7 Assigning
the task to a lawyer may also increase the cost of conducting
the analysis and thus decrease incentive to conduct a thorough
investigation.
If earnest self-evaluation is discouraged, there may be little
data to form a basis for self-correction. If this occurs, the only
sanctions that may be enforced for media misconduct will be
external; at least in some circumstances, these might be much
less effective than internal controls.
Perhaps most significantly, one commentator has suggested
that if self-analysis is discouraged, denial of an SEP will be self-
defeating.68 If potential litigants merely fail to perform self-
evaluations, or do an inadequate job, the desired information
would remain unavailable to potential adverse parties just as if
it were privileged. Moreover, if an evaluation is not under-
taken, self-critical materials outside the scope of the privilege69
are also not collected.
Within certain boundaries, courts seem to have struck the
balance between plaintiffs' need for disclosure and the need to
encourage candid self-evaluation by defendants in favor of rec-
65. Parker v. Kroger Co., 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) $8995 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Dick-
erson v. United States Steel Corp., 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1448, 1449 (E.D. Pa.
1976); Sanday v. Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 101, 103
(W.D. Pa. 1975). See also Flanagan, supra note 50, at 564-67.
66. Murphy, supra note 51, at 496-97; Case Comment, Civil Procedure: Se~f-Evalu-
ative Reports-A Qualified Privilege in Discovery?, 57 MINN. L. REV. 807, 819-20
(1973). See also text accompanying note 131.
The attorney-client privilege is the "client's privilege to refuse to disclose and to
prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications between [him]
and his attorney." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 118 (5th ed. 1979); see, e.g., CAL. EVID.
CODE § 954 (West Supp. 1984). The work-product rule protects "the mental impres-
sions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney ... concerning the litiga-
tion." FED. R. Civ. PROC. 26(b)(3).
67. See supra text accompanying note 12 and infra note 131 and accompanying
text.
68. Note, supra note 51, at 1088.
69. See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
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ognizing the SEP. Most of the decisions that have dealt with
the SEP have been rendered in employment discrimination
cases in which the plaintiff employee asserted statutorily pro-
tected civil rights of a constitutional nature.7 1 But while the
public interest in protecting these rights-as expressed through
detailed legislation-makes the argument in favor of disclosure
particularly persuasive,72 the privilege has nevertheless been
upheld. If the public policy underlying plaintiff's claim is of
common law origin and has not been codified, courts may be
even less willing to hold that the policy requires disclosure. 4
D. Limitations to the SEP
The SEP is not an absolute privilege,75 and federal courts
have placed numerous limitations on its exercise.
1. Case-by-Case Determination
One unresolved issue is the weight to be given precedent rec-
ognizing the SEP in subsequent cases. Some courts have re-
tained the right to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the
privilege exists 76 or have chosen to override the privilege be-
cause of a plaintiff's "compelling need. '77 The problem with
this ad hoc approach is that the effectiveness of the privilege in
encouraging the flow of information depends on the extent to
which people may rely on continuing confidentiality.78 While
70. But cf. Gray v. Board of Higher Educ., 692 F.2d at 901; see supra text accompa-
nying notes 48-50.
71. See, e.g., Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 552 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1977). The
Keyes court upheld the SEP in a sex discrimination suit that was "based on Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Four-
teenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution." Id at 579.
72. See supra note 51.
73. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. In some cases courts have held
that, although the need for disclosure is especially strong, the interest at stake is bet-
ter protected in the long run by granting the SEP. Roberts v. National Detroit Corp.,
87 F.R.D. 30, 32 (E.D. Mich. 1980); O'Connor, 86 F.R.D. at 215.
74. However, there may exist situations in which public policy, although not stat-
utorily expressed, may mandate disclosure. For a discussion of the policy considera-
tions in Westmoreland, see infra notes 115-30 and accompanying text.
75. Bredice, 50 F.R.D. at 251.
76. See, e.g., Jepsen v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 610 F.2d 1379, 1384 (5th Cir. 1980);
Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 552 F.2d at 581; Zaustinsky v. University of Cal., 96
F.R.D. 622, 624 (N.D. Cal. 1983); cf. Wood v. Breier, 54 F.R.D. 7, 11 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (ad
hoc balancing for executive privilege).
77. Gray, 692 F.2d at 907.
78. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), wherein the Court said of
the attorney-client privilege: "An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be
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the Federal Rules of Evidence declare that the laws relating to
privileges "shall be governed by the principles of the common
law as they may be interpreted by the courts ... in the light of
reason and experience, '79 this discretion should be exercised by
the courts in developing the rules to govern the SEP on a case-
by-case basis, rather than in deciding ad hoc whether the privi-
lege should be recognized.80 The Bredice decision is a little
more than a decade old; it seems that courts will treat prece-
dent with greater deference as the still nascent self-evaluative
privilege matures.
2. Facts Versus Subjective Conclusions and Evaluations
A general rule has developed which provides that only sub-
jective conclusions are protected by the SEP and that statistics
and other factual material compiled for the self-evaluation
should be disclosed.8 ' While it has been criticized, 2 the rule is
well established and not without justification. Because the
quality of the facts and statistics compiled has no real relation-
ship to the confidentiality fostered by the SEP, and because
their accuracy is readily verifiable and often available notwith-
standing the privilege, the rationale behind the privilege is not
applicable to this objective type of information.83 Furthermore,
the public has a much greater interest in the disclosure of rele-
vant facts than in gaining access to the subjective evaluations of
a source of confidential information.
The confidentiality of subjective opinions may be protected
through in camera examination; 4 the burden, however, may
then be placed on the party seeking protection to edit out any
certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no
privilege at all." I at 393. See also Kott v. Perini, 283 F. Supp. 1, 2 (N.D. Ohio 1968)
(official information privilege).
79. FED. R. EVID. 501.
80. United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 367 (1980); Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 396; Note,
supra note 51, at 1097-98. But compare Flanagan, supra note 50, at 576, in which the
author argues that the SEP is in fact "not an evidentiary privilege but rather an exer-
cise in discretionary protection founded in the court's power over discovery." Thus,
Professor Flanagan concludes that each self-evaluative privilege case should be de-
cided individually. Id. at 582.
81. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1448, 1449 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Wright v. Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n, 72 F.R.D.
161, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
82. Note, supra note 51, at 1094-96.
83. Dickerson, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1449.
84. Rosario v. New York Times Co., 84 F.R.D. 626, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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material subject to the SEP. 5
3. Subpoena by Administrative Agency
The public interest in disclosure has been held to outweigh
the potential harms where the SEP is asserted in response to a
subpoena issued on behalf of an administrative agency; thus,
the protection will be denied in such situations.8 6
4. Government-Required Documents
In both Resnick v. American Dental Association8 7 and Webb
v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,8 8 the courts held the SEP inap-
posite where the analysis was not required by the government,
based on the assumption that the SEP had never been applied
to such documents.8 9 Obviously, this conclusion reflects an ig-
norance of the origins of the privilege in Bredice, which did not
involve any government report. Therefore, Webb and Resnick
are of dubious precedential value on this point.
In addition, the Resnick court declared that the SEP's ration-
ale was inapplicable where the self-evaluation was required by
the government.' The opinion, however, took no cognizance of
the main public policy justification for the privilege-i.e., en-
couraging parties to undertake candid confidential self-analy-
ses.9 1 This rationale may be especially strong if the study is not
mandated by government regulation.
5. Retrospective Review
Amplifying dictum in Bredice, one court concluded that the
SEP may not be asserted successfully if the self-evaluation is
performed in order to solve a current specific problem, rather
than to retrospectively review procedures in general.2
85. O'Connor, 86 F.R.D. at 218.
86. FTC v. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Emerson Elec. Co. v. Schles-
inger, 609 F.2d 898 (8th Cir. 1979); In re Horizon Corp., 88 F.T.C. 515 (1976).
87. 95 F.R.D. 372 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
88. 81 F.R.D. 431 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
89. Resnick, 95 F.R.D. at 374-75; Webb, 81 F.R.D. at 434-35.
90. Resnick, 95 F.R.D. at 374-75.
91. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
92. Davidson v. Light, 79 F.R.D. 137, 139 (D. Colo. 1978) (discussing Bredice, 50
F.R.D. at 250). One commentator has concluded that the self-evaluation undertaken
in Westmoreland was "conducted in the ordinary course of business to evaluate and
suggest operational improvements." Flanagan, supra note 50, at 568. Thus, the Da-
vidson exception to the SEP would not apply to the study at issue in Westmoreland.
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IV
Application of the SEP to Westmoreland
A. Regulating Media Responsibility
As our society's newsgathering institutions grow in size and
diminish in number, and as the technology of newsgathering
becomes more complex and efficient, the power of the new-
sgathering media increases.93 With this increased power comes
a greater capacity for harm if the power is exercised irresponsi-
bly. This possibility is especially true of television news be-
cause of its emphasis on conflict and the visually spectacular, as
well as its intrusiveness on both subject and viewer.
There seems to be little doubt that the American press is
viewed with increasing distrust. 4 This trend can be attributed
to a variety of factors. The media's power is largely unre-
strained, and its defenders can be self-righteous to the point of
arrogance.95 Several recent scandals bear this out.96 Further-
more, the damage which results from irresponsible journalism
is often irreversible.97 In essence, many fear and hate the press
because it is seen as creating, rather than responding to, public
opinion.9
While there appears to be a problem with the media's abuse
of its power, solutions are not so evident. Governmental regu-
93. See generally Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 248-51
(1974) (dicta).
94. Sheran & Isaacman, Do We Want a Responsible Press?, 8 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1, 25-31 (1982); see also Connally, Opening Remarks, THE PRESS: FREE AND RE-
SPONSIBLE? 15-24 (H. Purvis ed. 1982); Henry, Journalism Under Fire, TIME, Dec. 12,
1983, at 76; Purvis, Introduction, THE PRESS: FREE AND RESPONSIBLE?, supra, at 6-7.
95. See Barrett, Panel Statement, THE PRESS: FREE AND RESPONSIBLE?, supra
note 94, at 28 ("I find it ironical that the established press, one of the most powerful
institutions in modern society, and well able to fight its own battles in the political
arenas, has an apparently insatiable appetite for constitutional guarantees."); Kraft,
Panel Statement, id. at 33 ("I think we [the press] are alive and well and eating our
attackers for breakfast every day . .. I think we are full of ourselves."). See also
Cox, Panel Statement, id. at 30; Henry, supra note 94, at 77; Lehrer, Concluding Re-
marks, THE PRESS: FREE AND RESPONSIBLE?, supra note 94, at 99.
96. For several examples, see Henry, supra note 94, at 79-82; Purvis, supra note
94, at 1-6.
97. It is questionable whether a right of reply will in fact restore the damaged
reputation of an allegedly defamed person. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
344 n.9 (1974). But cf. Carter, Right of Reply Versus the Sullivan Rule: Time for a
Second Look, 27 LOY. L. REV. 41, 61-68 (1981). Furthermore, mandatory right of ac-
cess statutes are unconstitutional, at least with respect to the print media. Tornillo,
418 U.S. at 256-58.
98. See generally Henry, supra note 94; Sheran & Isaacman, supra note 94, at 8-31.
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lation of journalistic responsibility is problematical at best. 9
Any attempt at direct regulation of media conduct through li-
censing or other legislation faces difficult, if not impossible,
constitutional obstacles, especially with regard to the print me-
dia.100 Even though the electronic media is licensed under the
auspices of the Federal Communications Commission, it is
given considerable responsibility to self-regulate its program-
ming in the public interest.10
If any such regulation were found not to have a chilling ef-
fect on freedom of the press, the social utility of making the
newsgathering media answerable to government would still be
questionable. Some self-censorship would result, and editorial
decisions could become politicized. The extensive fact-finding
necessary to make the regulatory process effective would drain
both the public coffer and the media's time and energies. But
perhaps most importantly, external regulation would put the
newsgatherer in a defensive posture. Instead of using this data
to critically question its past performance, the journalistic en-
tity subject to external regulation would be primarily con-
cerned with maintaining its freedom from governmental
restriction. The newsgathering organization is, in fact, the
party best able to assess its performance simply because it has
the greatest access to the necessary data.
Assuming the newsgatherer has, in fact, performed below
standard, a suit for defamation remains the traditional means
of redress for an individual who claims to have been wronged
by the press; the threat of civil liability, however, is an ineffec-
tive means of deterring media misbehavior. 02 Since New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan10 3 and its progeny 0 4 established the "ac-
tual malice" standard for liability in defamation actions
brought by public-figure plaintiffs,' it has been extremely dif-
99. Any detailed treatment of this issue is beyond the scope of this note. For a
discursive treatment of the subject, see Sheran & Isaacman, supra note 94, at 55-89.
100. See, e.g., Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256-58 (first amendment forbids mandatory right
of access statute); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559-62 (1976) (prior
restraint on newspaper must undergo strict scrutiny notwithstanding criminal de-
fendant's right to fair trial).
101. See, e.g., CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
102. Sheran & Isaacman, supra note 94, at 44.
103. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
104. Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130 (1967).
105. Sullivan held that the first amendment "prohibits a public official from recov-
ering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he
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ficult to establish the legal elements of libel.' Liberalization
of libel law in recent years10 7 has greatly increased litigation
costs, in terms of time, money, and energy to media defend-
ants10 8 without necessarily helping to vindicate deserving plain-
tiffs.109 Furthermore, it is questionable whether facilitating
libel recovery encourages responsible journalism.1 0
Recent statistical studies have clearly shown that in defama-
tion litigation against media defendants, plaintiffs are far more
likely to receive favorable verdicts from juries, while defend-
ants are much more likely to be successful on appeal."' The
public, as represented by juries, seems to be outraged by the
conduct giving rise to the litigation. The data indicate that
although the legal requirements for establishing defamation
proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." 376 U.S. at
279-80 (emphasis added).
106. Sheran & Isaacman, supra note 94, at 44 n.151.
107. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (plaintiff may inquire into edi-
torial process in attempting to establish actual malice).
108. Sheran & Isaacman, supra note 94, at 47-48. See also Lewis, New York Times
v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to Return to "The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment," 83 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 609-12 (1983) (speaking generally of the huge
cost of discovery in Westmoreland-in part due to the anticipated privilege claims by
both sides).
109. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
110. See infra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
111. In his first statistical study of defamation litigation, Professor Marc Franklin
reported that 90% (18 out of 20) of jury verdicts in cases reaching trial between 1976
and mid-1979 were for plaintiffs. Franklin, Winners and Losers and Why: A Study of
Defamation Litigation, 1980 AM. BAR FOUND. RESEARCH J. 455, 473. Two-thirds of
these verdicts (12) were reversed on appeal. Id. at 474. Overall, plaintiffs had a five
percent (7 out of 138) success rate on appeal, as compared with a 60% (83 out of 138)
success rate for media defendants; 35% of the appeals were remanded. Id. at 476.
In a subsequent study Professor Franklin found that, of 24 media libel cases tried
before juries from 1977 through early 1980, 20 resulted in verdicts for plaintiff.
Franklin, Suing Media for Libel: A Litigation Study, 1981 AM. BAR FOUND. RESEARCH
J. 795, 804. While 12 of these 20 were reversed on appeal, id. at 806, all four jury
verdicts for media defendants were affirmed on appeal. Id. More recent studies con-
ducted by the Libel Defense Resource Center bear out the trends noted by Franklin.
LIBEL DEFENSE RESOURCE CENTER BULLETIN 1, 2, 10, 15, 16, 33, 37-39, 58 (Mar. 15,
1984) (available in the Comm/Ent Office).
One commentator attributes the willingness of defamation plaintiffs to bring suit,
although their claims do not meet legal and constitutional standards set by appellate
courts, to the prospect of large trial court awards. Smolla, Let the Author Beware:
The Rejuvenation of the American Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7 (1983). In
turn, he suggests that these large awards are partly due to "an unconscious infiltra-
tion of strict liability values into the law of defamation," id. at 24, and partly due to
"anti-media bias on the part of juries." Id. at 63. See supra notes 94-98 and infra note
120 and accompanying text.
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are not being met, juries still feel that the press deserves pun-
ishment for its misbehavior. Thus, the public interest lies in
encouraging the press to set stricter standards for its profes-
sional conduct. As case law has suggested, however, disclosure
of self-evaluative materials may encourage potential defend-
ants to set minimal performance goals.1 12
It appears that the best method of inducing fair, professional
journalistic behavior is to encourage media self-regulation. 113
Indeed, even the litigants in Westmoreland agreed on this
point. As plaintiff's counsel noted, "The real issue here is not
General Westmoreland. It is, will the press police them-
selves? 11 4  The disagreement, then, in Westmoreland was
whether disclosure or application of the SEP would better
serve this goal.
B. Public Policy and the SEP
The rationale for the SEP set forth in Bredice and Banks"5 is
relevant to a case such as Westmoreland. Numerous affidavits
were submitted to the Westmoreland court by journalists, in-
dustry executives, and their counsel, all strenuously asserting
that newsgathering media self-evaluations will be discouraged
by compelled disclosure.11 6 CBS asserted that the conclusions
voiced in the Sauter Memorandum "would not have been possi-
ble if the process of arriving at them had not been
confidential.""' 7
112. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
113. See Sheran & Isaacman, supra note 94, at 115-42 (proposing a comprehensive
"unenforceable" media code of ethics, promulgated by and for journalists); see also
affidavits submitted in Westmoreland (on file in the Comm/Ent Office). CBS and
ABC have appointed executive vice-presidents to investigate complaints submitted by
the public.
114. Bruck, supra note 3, at 82.
115. See supra notes 34-53 and accompanying text.
116. Copies of the affidavits of Edward R. Cony (Vice-President/News, Dow Jones
and Co., Inc.), Reuven Frank (President, News Division, NBC), Ernest J. Schultz, Jr.
(Executive Vice-President, Radio-Television News Directors Association), Stephen E.
Nevas (First Amendment Counsel, National Association of Broadcasters), Richard M.
Smith (Executive Editor, NEWSWEEK), George Watson (Vice-President, ABC News),
and William L. Green (Director of University Relations, Duke University) are on file
in the Comm/Ent Office.
117. Defendant's Response, supra note 19, at 8. CBS made a similar argument in
contesting the admissibility of the Benjamin Report at trial. It argued that the Report
was undertaken as a subsequent remedial measure and should therefore be inadmissi-
ble under Fed. R. Evid. 407. Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., No. 82 Civ. 7913, slip op. at 2-
4. The court rejected this contention, dismissing the Gilman and Bredice cases, upon
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This argument went uncontroverted; instead, plaintiff's
counsel argued the compelling need11 of libel plaintiffs for
open discovery and the right of the public to know the true
facts.119 In effect, Westmoreland contended that the news-
gathering media's responsibility to the public was of utmost im-
portance and that it could best be encouraged by facilitating
libel plaintiffs' access to defendants' confidential self-evaluative
reports.
The studies discussed in the previous section indicate that
even if libel law effectively deters the newsgathering media
from acting maliciously, it does not regulate their unfair be-
havior.120 Thus, the notion that making media self-evaluations
available to defamation plaintiffs will somehow encourage the
media to be more responsive to public standards of fairness and
integrity seems questionable.
Such a conclusion is deducible without resort to statistics.
Malice and lack of professionalism are two separate and in-
dependent standards for judging the performance of journalists
and journalistic institutions. In a defamation cause of action,
disclosure that makes it easier to show actual malice will argua-
bly deter newsgathering media defendants from acting with
malice. Disclosure, however, will not only deter malicious be-
havior, but will also discourage newsgathering media from vig-
orously investigating the more common journalistic
transgressions that may not be malicious, but may be merely
unfair, irresponsible, shoddy, insensitive, or unprofessional.' 2'
which CBS relied, as mere "exceptions to the rule [rather than] the rule itself." Id. at
4.
118. Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's Response to "Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's
Opposition to Motion to Compel Production of Benjamin Report" at 3 [hereinafter
cited as Plaintiff's Response]. A copy of Plaintiff's Response is on file in the Comm/
Ent Office.
119. Plaintiff's Reply, supra note 21, at 8-9.
120. Sanford, Fairness and the Recent Trend in Libel Law, Wall. St. J., Dec. 15,
1982, at 28, col. 5. Indeed, the Westmoreland court itself recognized this distinction
between unfair and malicious behavior. Noting that "[t]he fairness of the ['Un-
counted Enemy'] broadcast is not at issue in the libel suit," and that "[t]he jury would
not be permitted to consider whether the publisher had acted fairly or unfairly,"
Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., No. 82 Civ. 7913, slip op. at 5 (emphasis added), the court
ruled that "the extensive discussions and expressions of opinion in the Benjamin Re-
port of fairness and related subjects" were inadmissible at trial to demonstrate legal
malice. Id. at 6. The court further held that the relevances of any violations of CBS
guidelines discussed in the Report would be "far outweighed by the potential for [ju-
ror] misunderstanding, confusion and prejudice." Id. at 6-7.
121. See supra notes 60-69 and accompanying text.
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Thus, compelling discovery of self-critical analyses will lead the
press to ignore such undesirable but less-than-outrageous be-
havior. Moreover, if self-evaluations are discouraged, disclo-
sure will have little long-term effect on the ability of plaintiffs
to prove their cases; if such studies are facile or self-serving, or
are based on incomplete or false information, they are no more
helpful to libel plaintiffs than no evaluations at all. 122
If one does not accept the argument that disclosure will en-
courage media responsibility and earnest self-evaluation, the
SEP must be analyzed as any other common law privilege.
Recognition of this privilege in a case such as Westmoreland
will depend on a balancing of the public interest in protecting
the confidential self-analyses of newsgathering media defend-
ants against the public interest in allowing libel plaintiffs open
discovery.
123
On the one hand, there exists a particularly strong public in-
terest in fostering candid self-evaluation by the newsgathering
media. Governmental and judicial controls cannot effectively
regulate media responsibility. 2 4 In the absence of some power-
ful government agency with broad investigative powers, the ef-
fectiveness with which any third party can examine the
performance of a newsgatherer will be limited by the candor
with which the newsgatherer examines itself. If there is to be
any insightful analysis into journalistic integrity, the journal-
ists themselves must be involved.125
On the other hand, the plaintiff in a defamation action is as-
serting injury to private common law dignitary rights. While
undoubtedly of great significance to the defamation plaintiff,
these rights may be of less public importance than those in-
volved in an employment discrimination suit. By definition, a
victim of discrimination is injured by virtue of his or her associ-
ation with a class of society rather than through his or her indi-
vidual status.'26 Furthermore, such a victim's cause of action
rests on rights of constitutional stature, under a statutorily ex-
122. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 99-114 and accompanying text.
125. See generally Sheran & Isaacman, supra note 94.
126. Discrimination is "the effect of a statute or established practice which confers
particular privileges on a class arbitrarily selected from a large number of persons, all
of whom stand in the same relation to the privileges granted and between whom and
those not favored no reasonable distinction can be found." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY
420 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added).
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pressed scheme of enforcement.127 Yet, although there is a par-
ticularly strong public policy argument for allowing
discrimination plaintiffs broad discovery to develop their cases,
the SEP has been recognized even for employment discrimina-
tion defendants.'28
An additional consideration is that much of the material that
could be protected by an SEP for the newsgathering media
would also fall within the attorney-client privilege and the
work-product rule if the self-analysis is conducted by an attor-
ney.129 Thus, if the SEP is rejected for journalist defendants, it
seems likely that much of the self-analysis would be performed
by attorneys rather than journalists in an attempt to circum-
vent discovery rules.3 °
The resulting reports will have considerably less effect in en-
couraging journalistic responsibility if written by lawyers in-
stead of journalists. A lawyer has different concerns, different
training, and a different perspective than does a journalist.' 3'
In effect, nonrecognition of the SEP would punish those organi-
zations with the integrity to investigate their own professional-
ism before they prepare for court. Moreover, if the
newsgathering media conducts its self-analysis in contempla-
tion of litigation, it will not be performing a truly "journalistic"
evaluation. In the end, it will be the public that suffers.
C. Waiver
The foregoing discussion rests on the assumption that the
self-evaluation in question has been conducted in confidence. If
the communications at issue in a case are not made in confi-
dence, any rationale for maintaining their "confidentiality" is
obviously not applicable, and the privilege should not attach. 32
Accordingly, the court in Westmoreland found that, because
the Benjamin Report was not confidential, there was "no occa-
127. See supra note 53.
128. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text; cf. Defendants' Response, supra
note 19, at 9-10 (citing In re Consumers Union, Inc., 32 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan)
1373 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (public interest in impartial confidential studies conducted by a
non-party to the action)).
129. See supra text accompanying note 66.
130. Indeed, Sauter was under pressure to conduct CBS's in-house study through
counsel. See supra text accompanying note 12.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 66, 67 and 125; see supra note 113 and ac-
companying text; see also Sheran & Isaacman, supra note 94, at 91 n.341.
132. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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sion to consider whether defendants' arguments would prevail
in establishing such a [self-evaluative] privilege on appropriate
facts.' 3 3 Perhaps the court wished to avoid this more contro-
versial issue; whatever its reason for so holding, the court's con-
clusion that the Report lacked confidentiality does not
withstand a reasoned analysis.
Westmoreland's main argument was that CBS never in-
tended the Benjamin Report to be confidential and that it had
in fact released its results through the Sauter Memorandum to
its own advantage.' The court agreed and found further that
the Sauter Memorandum "implies or states, that the Benjamin
Report substantiates the conclusions of the Uncounted Enemy
broadcast.' 35 The court concluded that "CBS. . . [could not]
at once hold out the Benjamin Report to the public as substan-
tiating its accusations and, when challenged, decline to reveal
the Report contending that it is a confidential internal study
utilized solely for self-evaluation and self-improvement.' 3 6
The court's declaration that the Sauter Memorandum relied
on the Benjamin Report in standing behind the original broad-
cast is patently wrong. The Sauter Memorandum explicitly
states that its support of the substance of the original broadcast
was based on the documentation presented in the original
show. 37
The Memorandum does rely on the Benjamin Report to sup-
port its conclusions with regard to journalistic practices utilized
in producing "The Uncounted Enemy." This does not necessar-
ily imply, however, that the entire Benjamin Report should be
discoverable. For analytical purposes, the Benjamin Report
may be divided into three elements: factual data, subjective
commentary by Benjamin's sources, and Benjamin's own sub-
jective conclusion.
The factual information contained in the Report is discovera-
ble even under the SEP.'3 8 The Benjamin Report also contains
numerous references to the confidential conclusions and opin-
ions of the people Benjamin interviewed. While the Sauter
133. Westmoreland, 97 F.R.D. at 706.
134. Plaintiff's Response, supra note 118, at 3; Plaintiff's Reply, supra note 21, at 2-
3.
135. Westmoreland, 97 F.R.D. at 706.
136. Id.
137. Sauter Memorandum, supra note 11, at 3.
138. See supra text accompanying note 135.
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Memorandum does refer to the interviews, nothing in it sug-
gests that the interviews included subjective evaluations, let
alone whether they support or negate Benjamin's ultimate
findings.139 CBS asserted that while it did intend to release the
results of Benjamin's study, it never intended to release the
substance of these interviews.4 0 It was these communica-
tions-made to Benjamin and revealed in confidence only to
those few who originally saw his Report-that CBS sought to
protect.
Westmoreland could rightfully have requested access to the
subjective evaluations made by Benjamin himself, as the sub-
stance of these was made public. If, however, the SEP had been
held applicable, the court could have required CBS to edit the
Report so as to maintain the confidentiality of those statements
which were privileged. 14 '
Plaintiff's counsel anticipated this argument. Citing two fed-
eral cases, 142 he contended that voluntary disclosure of part of a
privileged communication effects a waiver of the privilege with
regard to the entire communication about that subject. 43
These cases, however, are not controlling here because the law
of the forum state determined the existence of CBS's privilege
in Westmoreland.'" Thus, New York state law should deter-
mine whether disclosure of part of the Benjamin Report re-
sulted in a waiver with regard to any other portions of the
Report. 45
Two relatively recent New York lower court decisions have
directly held that a "partial waiver of a privilege effectively
waives the entirety thereof.'1 46 Neither case, however, dis-
cusses the justification for this rule or its application, but
merely cites perfunctorily an earlier case, Clark v. Geraci.47
In Clark, a litigant was found to have waived his patient-doc-
tor privilege as to the nature of his illnesses by divulging the
139. Defendants' Opposition, supra note 19, at 12.
140. Defendants' Response, supra note 19, at 5.
141. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
142. Handgards Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Inter-
national Tel. and Tel. Corp. v. United Tel. Co., 60 F.R.D. 177 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
143. Plaintiff's Motion, supra note 20, at 8.
144. FED. R. EVID. 501.
145. The Westmoreland court offered no legal precedent from any jurisdiction to
justify its conclusion that CBS waived any putative privilege. 97 F.R.D. at 706.
146. In re Carla L., 77 Misc. 2d 363, 371, 353 N.Y.S.2d 317, 328 (Faro. Ct. 1974); In re
Gigi B., 71 Misc. 2d 176, 178, 335 N.Y.S.2d 535, 538 (Faro. Ct. 1972).
147. 29 Misc. 2d 791, 208 N.Y.S.2d 564 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
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fact of his illnesses. 4 s The court apparently reasoned that,
under those circumstances, the party receiving a partial disclo-
sure would have been misled by receiving only half-truths. In-
deed, the only sensible rationale for the Clark rule is that it
would be unfair for a litigant to control the data available to the
trier of fact or to the adverse party through selective, mislead-
ing revelation of information.
This rationale is not applicable to the Westmoreland situa-
tion. CBS did not seek to control the flow of information
through selective disclosure. Any factual information in the
Benjamin Report would have been available to plaintiff even if
the Report had been held to be within the ambit of the SEP.'49
Furthermore, the network had little to gain through its partial
disclosure, for the subjective conclusions revealed in the Sauter
Memorandum were nothing short of public self-chastisement
for a job improperly done. Such disclosure cannot be said to be
manipulation of the truth for strategic purposes.
This narrow reading of the Clark rule finds support in other
New York cases. In Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel,150 the court ruled
that, in bringing an action for accounting against one's attor-
ney, one does not waive the attorney-client privilege for all pur-
poses; to do so "would in effect destroy this privilege."'15' More
significantly, the New York Court of Appeals recently empha-
sized in In re Vanderbilt152 that
[w]hile it is true that the attorney-client privilege does not at-
tach unless there is a "confidential communication". . . , this
does not require that all aspects of the communication, includ-
ing its topic, must be confidential to attach. Rather, the perti-
nent "confidence" arises from the attorney-client relationship
and the privacy of the ... communication ....1
The Benjamin Report contained two kinds of confidential
self-evaluative communications: those between Benjamin and
CBS, and those between Benjamin, as a representative of CBS,
and individuals involved with "The Uncounted Enemy." Only
the former were in fact made public.154 Although the Sauter
Memorandum disclosed that Benjamin interviewed various in-
148. Id. at 793-94, 208 N.Y.S.2d at 568.
149. See infra text accompanying note 157.
150. 43 Misc. 2d 462, 464, 251 N.Y.S.2d 565 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
151. Id. at 464, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 567.
152. 57 N.Y.2d 66, 453 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1982).
153. Id. at 76, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 668 (emphasis added).
154. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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dividuals regarding the program, Vanderbilt implies that this
disclosure is not sufficient to destroy the confidentiality of the
content of these discussions.
The SEP should not have been held waived by the Sauter
Memorandum. If candid self-criticism is the goal to be fostered
by the privilege, it should not be held to have been waived
when the evaluating entity publicly acknowledges its mistakes.
V
Conclusion
In the long run, recognition of the SEP is more likely to en-
courage media self-evaluation and responsiveness to public
opinion than is compelled disclosure of confidential reports.155
Public interest in fostering responsible journalism militates for
providing such encouragement to the media, while the public
interest in facilitating libel actions is relatively weak. There-
fore, the benefits of protecting the confidential sources, which
form the basis of voluntary media involvement, outweigh the
potential harms to libel plaintiffs that may result from nondis-
closure. 156 Thus, the privilege for confidential self-evaluative
memoranda should be extended to newsgathering media de-
fendants in defamation cases.
The SEP, however, should be subject to the same limitations
that have been recognized in other cases. Therefore, only sub-
jective conclusions and opinions should be protected, not
facts.'57 The privilege should not be invoked to avoid an admin-
istrative agency subpoena. 5 ' And lastly, an SEP for media de-
fendants should apply only to retrospective studies of
institutional procedures.'59 In effect, ongoing editorial proce-
dures would not be within the ambit of the privilege. 6 °
The value in granting a self-evaluative privilege to the news-
gathering media lies in encouraging them to be more respon-
155. See supra notes 116-22 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 123-32 and accompanying text.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 81-83.
158. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
159. See supra text accompanying note 92.
160. Cf. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 169-71 (1979) (holding that the editorial
process is not privileged from discovery). Plaintiff in Westmoreland asserted that
Herbert made all internal deliberations discoverable. Plaintiff's Response, supra note
118, at 5. In fact, this case merely dealt with the discoverability of an editor's state of
mind while making an editorial decision.
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sive to public standards of quality and sensitivity.' It is
antithetical to this value to punish those newsgathering organi-
zations that publicly take responsibility for their mistakes. 16 2
Therefore, an acknowledgement that a self-analysis will be
conducted and that the general conclusions of the study will be
released should not be deemed to destroy the confidentiality of
the communications that made the study possible.
161. See supra notes 94-131 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 142-54 and accompanying text.
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